Sometimes called the
Slovenian War, this was a short military conflict between Slovenia and
Yugoslavia that took place in 1991 following Slovenia's much longed for and brave declaration of
independence from Yugoslavia.The enterprising Slovenians had correctly anticipated what might happen and had in place a cunning plan which had to overcome a major problem of having units of the Yugoslav army already stationed in Slovenia. The text below was extracted from the Wikipedia entry.
When Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito died in 1980,
underlying ethnic, religious, and economic tensions within Yugoslavia were
quick to rise to the surface.
In 1989 Slobodan Miloševic, Chairman
of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia since 1986,
became president of Serbia, the largest and most populous of the six
Yugoslav republics. In April of the next year, Slovenia held its first
democratic multi-party elections, won by the DEMOS
coalition.
23 December 1990, Slovenia held a
referendum on independence which passed with 88% of the vote. The
Slovenian government expected the federal government in Belgrade to use
military force to rein in Slovenia's moves towards independence, and they
were right. Immediately after the Slovenian elections, the Yugoslav
People's Army (JNA) announced that a new defence doctrine would apply
across the country. The Tito-era doctrine of "General People's Defence",
in which each republic maintained a territorial defence force
(teritorialna obramba or T.O.), would be replaced by a centrally-directed
system of defence with immediate effect. All of the Yugoslav republics
would lose their role in defence matters and their T.Os would be disarmed
and subordinated to JNA headquarters in Belgrade.
The Slovenian
government resisted these moves, successfully ensuring that the majority
of Slovenian T.O. equipment was kept out of the hands of the JNA. It also
declared in a constitutional amendment passed on 28 September 1990 that
its T.O. would be under the sole command of the Slovenian government.
While all of this was going on, the Slovenian government was also in the
process of setting up a secret alternative command structure, known as the
Manoeuvre Structures of National Protection (Manevrska struktura narodne
zaščite, or MSNZ). This was an existing but antiquated institution, unique
to Slovenia, which was intended to enable the republic to form an ad hoc
defence structure, pretty much the same as a Home Guard. It was of
negligible importance prior to 1990, with practically obsolete weapons and
few members. However, the DEMOS-led government realised that the MSNZ
could be adapted to provide a parallel organisation to the T.O. that would
be entirely in the hands of the Slovenian government.
When the JNA
tried to take control of the Slovenian T.O., the TO's command structure
was simply replaced by that of the parallel MSNZ. Between May and October
1990, some 21,000 T.O. and police personnel were secretly mobilised into
the MSNZ command structure, of which the federal government had no idea.
The Slovenian government also made detailed plans for a military campaign
against the JNA, resulting in the production of an operational and
tactical plan by November 1990 — More than seven months before the
conflict actually began.
The Slovenes weren't foolish enough to
believe that they would be able to resist the JNA for a very long time.
Under Defence Minister Janez Janša, they adopted a strategy based on an
asymmetric warfare approach. T.O. units would carry out a guerrilla
campaign, using anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft missiles to ambush JNA
units. Tank columns could be trapped by destroying the lead and rear
vehicles in favourable terrain — on a narrow mountain road where room for
manoeuvre was limited, for example – enabling the rest to be tackled more
easily. In preparation for this, the Slovenian government covertly bought
lightweight missile systems from foreign suppliers, notably the SA-7 Grail
(Strela) anti-aircraft missile and the German-designed Armbrust anti-tank
system. Hit-and-run and delaying tactics were to be preferred, with
frontal clashes to be avoided; For the reason that the JNA's superior
firepower would have been very difficult to overcome in these
situations.
On the diplomatic front, neither the European Community
nor the United States were willing to recognise the independence of
Slovenia and strongly advocated the continuation of a unified Yugoslavia.
The Slovenian government asked for international assistance in negotiating
a peaceful breakup of Yugoslavia but was repeatedly turned away by Western
countries who preferred to deal with a single federation rather than
numerous small states. However, the Slovenes argued that they had no
choice in pushing for independence, due to the blatant lack of commitment
to democratic values on the part of the Belgrade
authorities.
Slovenia unexpectedly declared independence on 25 June
1991, even though it had previously announced that it would declare
independence on 26 June. This "advance" on the date of independence was a
vital element of the Slovenian plan to gain an early advantage in the
expected conflict. The Slovenian government fully expected the Yugoslav
military to respond with force on the day of the declaration of
independence or shortly afterwards. By secretly advancing the date by 24
hours, the Slovenians wrongfooted the Yugoslav government, which had
planned 26th of June as the date for its move.
Although the
Yugoslav army was strongly against Slovenian independence, it was divided
about what to do. The JNA Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Blagoje Adžić,
advocated a large-scale military operation to remove the Slovenian
government and bring "healthy forces" to power in the republic. His
political superior, the Yugoslav Defence Minister Colonel-General Veljko
Kadijević, preferred a more cautious approach – basically a show of force
that would convince the Slovenian government to back down on its
declaration of independence. After some debate, Kadijević got his way.
It is not known how much the civilian members of the Yugoslav
government were involved in the decision to resort to force in Slovenia.
Ante Marković, the President of the Federal Executive Council (equivalent
to Prime Minister) is quoted as saying that the federal government had not
been informed of the Army's actions.
On the morning of 26 June, the
first day of the war, units of the Yugoslav People's Army's 13th Corps
left their barracks in Rijeka, Croatia to move towards Slovenia's borders
with Italy. The move prompted a strong reaction from local Slovenes, who
organised spontaneous barricades and demonstrations against the JNA's
actions. No fighting took place though, as both sides seemed set on not
being the first to open fire.
By this time, the Slovenian
government had already put into action its plan to seize control of the
republic's border posts and the international airport at Brnik. The guards
manning the border posts were, in most cases, already Slovene, so the
Slovene take-over was pretty much a matter of changing uniforms and
insignia, without any fighting. This was undertaken, in the words of Janez
Janša, to "establish our sovereignty in the key triangle,
border-customs-air control." It also had important practical effects. By
taking control of the borders, the Slovenians were able to establish
defensive positions against an expected JNA attack. This meant that the
JNA would have to fire the first shots, which would enable the Slovenians
to portray the Yugoslav military as aggressors.
On the 2nd day of
the war, further JNA troop movements took place in the early hours,
including a column of tanks and armoured personnel carriers of the JNA 1st
Armoured Brigade leaving their barracks at Vrhnika near the Slovenian
capital Ljubljana, and heading for the airport at Brnik. They arrived a
few hours later and took control of the facilities. To the east, JNA units
left Maribor heading for the nearby border crossing at Šentilj and the
border town of Dravograd further west. The Yugoslav Air Force dropped
leaflets over various parts of Slovenia bearing the somewhat contradictory
messages "We invite you to peace and cooperation!" and "All resistance
will be crushed."
In the early hours of 27 June the Slovenian
leadership was told of the movements of the JNA. The military leadership
of the Fifth Military District, which included Slovenia, was in telephone
contact with Slovenian president Milan Kučan, telling him that the troops'
mission was limited to taking over the border crossings and airport. A
meeting of the Slovene presidency was hastily convened at which Kučan and
the rest of the members decided on armed resistance.
The Slovenian
government had received warnings that the JNA would use helicopters to
ferry special forces troops to strategic locations. It issued a warning to
the JNA's 5th Military Command District in Zagreb that if helicopters
continued to be used they would be shot down. The warning was disregarded
by the JNA leadership, which still believed that the Slovenians would back
down rather than fight. This was, however, a disastrous miscalculation.
That afternoon, the Slovenian T.O. shot down two JNA helicopters over
Ljubljana, killing the occupants. The ironic part of this story is that
one of the pilots was a Slovene. The first casualty of the war, a Slovene
shot down by the Slovene forces!
At Brnik, a T.O. unit attacked the
JNA troops, and in Trzin a firefight developed in which four JNA soldiers
and one T.O. soldier were killed and the remainder of the JNA unit was
forced to surrender. Despite the confusion and fighting, the JNA
nonetheless successfully accomplished much of its military mission. By
midnight on 27 June it had taken control of all of the crossings along the
Italian border, all but three crossings on the Austrian border and several
of the new crossing points established along Slovenia's border with
Croatia. However, many of its units were still stuck in vulnerable
positions across Slovenia.
On the third day of the war, the
Slovenian defence ministry ordered:
At all locations where RS [Republic
of Slovenia] armed forces have the tactical advantage, offensive actions
against enemy units and facilities will be carried out. The enemy will be
summoned to surrender, the shortest deadline possible for surrender given
and action taken using all available weapons. While in action, the
necessary arrangements will be made to evacuate and protect the civilians.
At Medvedjek in central Slovenia, another JNA tank column came
under attack at a truck barricade, where air raids killed six truck
drivers. Heavy fighting broke out at Nova Gorica on the border with Italy,
where the Slovenian Special Forces destroyed three JNA T-55 tanks and
captured three more. Four JNA soldiers were killed and nearly 100 more
surrendered.
The border crossing at Holmec was captured by
Slovenian forces, with two fatalities on the Slovenian side and three on
the JNA side; 91 JNA soldiers were captured. The Yugoslav Air Force
carried out attacks at a number of locations across the country, most
notably at Brnik Airport, where two Austrian journalists were killed and
four Adria Airways airliners were seriously damaged. The Air Force also
attacked the Slovenian military headquarters at Kočevska Reka and flew
sorties against radio and television transmitters at Krim, Kum, Trdinov
vrh and Nanos in an attempt to silence the Slovenian government's
broadcasts.
By the end of the day, the JNA still held many of its
positions but was rapidly losing ground. It was already beginning to
suffer problems with desertions — many Slovenian members of the JNA quit
their units or simply changed sides - and both the troops on the ground
and the leadership in Belgrade appeared to have little idea of what to do
next.
On the fourth day of the war three EC foreign ministers met
with Slovenian and Yugoslav government representatives in Zagreb during
the night and agreed on a ceasefire plan. The plan was not put into
practice. In the morning, the Slovenes achieved several significant
military successes. The JNA troops at Brnik Airport surrendered to
Slovenian forces, who had surrounded the facility overnight. In the north,
several JNA tanks were captured near Strihovec and later reorganised into
a T.O. tank company. JNA special forces attempted a maritime landing at
Hrvatini but were ambushed and repulsed by the Slovenians. The JNA-held
border crossings at Vrtojba and Šentilj also fell to the Slovenians, who
seized the federal troops' weapons and tanks, providing a much-needed
boost to their arsenal.
The JNA issued an ultimatum to Slovenia,
demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities by 0900 on 30 June. In
response, the Slovenian Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a
peaceful solution to the crisis that did not jeopardise Slovenian
independence, and rejected the JNA ultimatum.
The fifth day of the
war saw continued skirmishing in several places. Slovenian forces captured
the strategic Karavanke Tunnel under the Alps on the border with Austria
and captured nine JNA tanks near Nova Gorica.
On the sixth day of
the war the JNA's ammunition dump at Črni Vrh caught fire and was
destroyed in a massive explosion, damaging much of the town. In the
meantime, the JNA's leadership sought permission to change the tempo of
its operations. Defence Minister Veljko Kadijević informed the Yugoslav
cabinet that the JNA's first plan - a limited operation to secure
Slovenia's border crossings had failed, and that it was time to put into
operation the backup plan of a full-scale invasion and imposition of
military rule in Slovenia. However, the cabinet — headed at the time by
Serbia's Borislav Jovic — refused to authorise such an operation.
The seventh day of the war saw the heaviest fighting so far, and
it was a day of disasters for the JNA. The JNA tank column in the
Krakovski forest came under sustained attack from TO units, forcing it to
surrender. Units from the JNA's Fourth Armoured Corps attempted to move up
from Jastrebarsko in Croatia but were beaten back near the border town of
Bregana. The Slovenian T.O. mounted successful attacks on border crossings
at Šentilj, Gornja Radgona, Fernetiči and Gorjansko, capturing them and
taking a number of JNA troops prisoner. A lengthy engagement between JNA
and Slovenian forces took place during the afternoon and evening at
Dravograd, and a number of JNA facilities around the country fell to
Slovenian forces.
At 9pm, the Slovenian Presidency announced a
unilateral ceasefire. However, this was rejected by the JNA leadership,
which vowed to "take control" and crush Slovenian resistance.
On
the eight day of the war a large JNA armoured convoy set off from Belgrade
for Slovenia. It never arrived; according to the official account, this
was due to mechanical breakdowns. However, observers have suggested that
the real reason for the troop movement was to position the JNA for its
imminent attack on the Croatian region of eastern Slavonia.
On the
ninth day of the war and with a ceasefire now in force, the two sides
disengaged. Slovenian forces took control of all of the country's border
crossings, and JNA units were allowed to withdraw peacefully to barracks
and to cross the border to Croatia.
The Ten-Day War was formally
ended the next day with the agreement of the Brioni Accord, signed on the
Croatian Brioni Islands. The terms were distinctly favourable to Slovenia;
a three-month moratorium on Slovenian independence was agreed — which in
practical terms had little real impact — and the Slovenian police and
armed forces were recognised as sovereign on their territory.
It
was agreed that all Yugoslav military units would leave Slovenia, with the
Yugoslav Government setting a deadline of the end of October to complete
the process. The Slovenian government insisted that the withdrawal should
proceed on its terms; the JNA was not allowed to take much of its heavy
weaponry and equipment, which was later either deployed locally or sold to
other Yugoslav republics. The withdrawal began about ten days later and
was completed by 26 October. Return to previous page